





Capital Accumulation and Resource Depletion: 











Abstract. How rich would resource-abundant countries be if they had actually followed the 
Hartwick Rule (invest resource rents in other assets) over the last 30 years? We employ time 
series data on investment and rents on exhaustible resource extraction for 70 countries to answer 
this question. The results are striking: Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Gabon would all be 
as wealthy as South Korea, while Nigeria would be five times as well off as it is currently. We 
also derive a specific rule for sustainability – maintain positive constant genuine investment – 
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There is by now a substantial empirical literature documenting the ‘resource curse’ or ‘paradox 
of plenty.’
1 Resource-rich countries should enjoy an advantage in the development process, and 
yet these countries experienced lower GDP growth rates post-1970 than less well endowed 
countries. A number of plausible explanations for this phenomenon have been suggested: 
inflated currencies may impede the development of the non-oil export sector (‘Dutch disease’); 
easy money in the form of resource rents may reduce incentives to implement needed economic 
reforms; and volatile resource prices may complicate macroeconomic management, exacerbating 
political conflicts over the sharing and management of resource revenues. 
 
In the most extreme examples, levels of welfare in resource-rich countries are lower today than 
they were in 1970 – development has not been sustained by Pezzey’s (1989) definition. The 
Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977) offers what Solow (1986) termed a ‘rule of thumb’ for 
sustainability in exhaustible resource economies – a maximal constant level of consumption can 
be sustained if the value of investment equals the value of rents on extracted resources at each 
point in time. For countries dependent on such wasting assets this rule offers a prescription
2 for 
sustainable development, a prescription that Botswana in particular has followed with its 
diamond wealth (Lange and Wright 2004). 
 
Drawing on a 30-year time series of resource rent data underlying the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2004), we construct a ‘Hartwick Rule counterfactual’: how rich would 
countries be in the year 2000 if they had followed the Hartwick Rule since 1970? The results are, 
in many cases, striking. 
 
Our empirical work draws upon new results
3 showing that the Hartwick Rule is a special case of 
a more general rule for sustainability. We extend the results in Hamilton and Withagen (2004) to 
determine the properties of a constant net saving rule – constant positive net savings entails a 
path for consumption that rises without bound. We then apply this rule and the standard 
Hartwick Rule to our historical data on investment and resource rents covering 1970-2000. 
 
The Generalized Rule for Sustainability 
 
For a quite general model of a dynamic economy, Hamilton and Withagen (2004) establish that 
if the economy is competitive (households maximize utility while firms maximize profits) and if 
externalities are internalized through Pigovian taxes, then utility U, consumption C, net 
(genuine) saving G and interest rate r are related as follows: 
 
( ) G rG U U C & & − = . (1) 
 
                                                 
1 See Auty 2001, Ch. 1 for a good overview. One of the earliest studies was Sachs and Warner (1995). 
2 Note that Asheim et al. (2003) question whether the Hartwick rule is truly prescriptive. This is partly because a 
commitment to invest resource rents now cannot commit future generations to do the same. 
3 Hamilton and Hartwick (forthcoming) and Hamilton and Withagen (2004).   2
This relates the current change in utility to the sign and rate of growth of genuine saving. But, 
since optimality is not assumed, it also provides the basis for a general rule for sustainability 
(non-declining utility). If the policy rule is to hold  0 = G  for all time, then this is just the 




For our purposes we assume a simple economy with an exhaustible resource that is essential for 
production, as in Dasgupta and Heal (1979). For capital K and resource extraction R, the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas, 
β αR K F = ,  1 = + β α . Output is divided between 
consumption and investment, so that  ( ) K C R K F & + = , . Utility is given by  () C U U = . Resource 
extraction is assumed to be efficient, implying that  ∫
∞
=
0 0 ds R S  – the initial resource stock  0 S  is 
exhausted over the infinite time horizon. The initial endowment of produced capital is  0 K . 
 
Competitiveness in the Dasgupta-Heal economy implies that the resource price is equal to  R F , 
that the interest rate is  K F , and that the Hotelling Rule is satisfied, 
 
K R R F F F = & . (2) 
 
Genuine saving is given by, 
 
R F K G R − ≡ & . (3) 
 
Hamilton and Hartwick (forthcoming) establish the following basic proposition for the 
Dasgupta-Heal economy, analogous to expression (1): 
 
Proposition 1: In the competitive Dasgupta-Heal economy, G G F C K & & − = . 
 
Hamilton and Hartwick also prove the following wealth accounting result. It will be useful in 
proving the main proposition below. 
 
Proposition 2: Under constant returns to scale total wealth is given by 
∫
∞ −∫ = + =
t
d F






The following proposition characterizes a particular instance of a generalized sustainability rule 
in the Dasgupta-Heal economy, an instance we will exploit empirically in the next section. 
 
Proposition 3: If  β α >  then  t G G ∀ > = 0  for constant  ( ) 0 F G α < is a feasible program for 
rising consumption. Initial consumption will be lower than on the Hartwick Rule ( 0 = G ) path, 
                                                 
4 Dixit et al. (1980) derive expression (1) in the proof of their main proposition, where they show that utility will be 
constant if either  t G ∀ = 0  or  0 , 0 > ∀ = G t r G G & .   3
but consumption increases without bound. Wealth on this path is greater than under the standard 
Hartwick Rule, and maximum wealth is independent of the initial resource stock  0 S . 
 
Proof: See Annex I. 
 
Having established the properties of this specific sustainability rule for the Dasgupta-Heal 
economy, we now turn to the empirical application of the rule to historical data. 
 
Hypothetical Estimates of Capital Stocks 
 
While the foregoing theory can be shown to apply to rules for saving in an open economy, we 
will limit ourselves to investment rules in the empirical application. All of the countries which 
are highlighted in the empirical results had significant net foreign debts in 2000. Rather than 
looking at the more complex question of whether resource rents could have been used to either 
pay down foreign debt or invest in domestic assets, we limit ourselves to comparing an estimate 
of the current stock of produced capital with a hypothetical estimate of how large this stock 
could be if resource rents had been invested in produced capital. We assume that all resource 
rents are invested in produced capital for simplicity, although the theory suggests more generally 
that resource rents could be invested in a range of assets, including human capital – if any of the 
countries highlighted below had in fact been investing their resource rents in human capital 
(quite unlikely given the observed levels of per capita income) then our methodology would 
produce a biased picture of their investment performance. 
 
In order to examine a variety of counterfactuals, we derive four estimates of produced capital 
stock using empirical data covering 1970-2000: (i) a baseline capital stock derived from 
investment series and a Perpetual Inventory Model (PIM); (ii) a capital stock derived from strict 
application of the standard Hartwick Rule; (iii) a capital stock derived from the constant net or 
genuine investment rule; and (iv) a capital stock derived from the maximum of observed net 
investment and the investment required under the constant genuine investment rule. All 
investment and resource rent series are measured in constant 1995 US dollars at nominal 
exchange rates. 
 
Details of the PIM are given in Hamilton (2002). For each country the estimate of baseline 














Here I is gross investment, the average asset service life T is assumed to be 20 years and the 
depreciation rate γ is 5% – these are held constant across countries and over time. We use the 
year 2000 as our basis for comparison of capital stocks. 
 
For genuine investment I
G , net investment N, depreciation of produced capital D and resource 
depletion R we have the following basic identities at any point in time: 
 
  R D I I
G − − ≡    4
 
R I D I N
G + = − ≡  
 
Note that, given a base year capital stock estimate, it is possible to estimate capital stocks beyond 
the base year by simply accumulating net investment in each period. Therefore, for constant 
G I , 
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We calculate two versions of K
* in what follows – one with  0 =
G I  (the standard Hartwick rule), 
and a second with 
G I  equal to a constant 5% of 1987 GDP. The choice of a particular level of 
genuine investment for the analysis is obviously arbitrary. We use 5% of 1987 GDP for the 
following reasons: (i) there is some logic to choosing the mid-point of our time series of data 
from 1970-2000, but 1987 is a slightly better choice, falling after the early 1980’s recession, after 
the collapse of oil prices in 1986, and before the early 1990’s recession;  and (ii) a 5% genuine 
investment rate is roughly the average achieved by low income countries over time. Since the 
elasticity of output with respect to produced capital α is implicitly greater than 0.5 in the 
theoretical model of the preceding section, the choice of 5% of GDP ensures that the feasibility 
condition  () 0 F G α <  of Proposition 3 is satisfied. 
 
Resource depletion is estimated as the sum of total rents on the extraction of the following 
commodities: crude oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, 
silver and zinc. While the underlying theory suggests that scarcity rents are what should be 
invested under the Hartwick rule (i.e. price minus marginal extraction cost), the World Bank data 
do not include information on marginal extraction costs. This gives an upward bias to the 
hypothetical capital stock estimates under the genuine investment rules. 
 
There is another clear divergence between our empirical methods and the theory of the preceding 
section. In the autarkic Dasgupta-Heal economy presented above, the choice of policy rule also 
determines the level and path of resource rents ( R F ). By using historical rents in our calculations 
we are clearly diverging from the theory. However, in most instances we would expect resource 
exporters to be price takers, which favors using historical rents. If resource prices change 
exogenously, a further adjustment to saving to reflect future capital gains is required (see 
Vincent et al. 1997), but Hamilton and Bolt (2004) show that the adjustment is typically small if 
historical price trends are extrapolated. 
 
When comparing estimates of the stock of produced capital for different countries, it is worth 
noting that the Perpetual Inventory Model underestimates the capital stock for countries with 
very old infrastructure, as in most European countries. The value of roads, bridges and buildings 
constructed many decades and even centuries ago is not captured by the PIM. Pritchett (2000)   5
makes a different point, that low returns on investments imply that the PIM overestimates the 
value of capital in developing countries. Our methodology assumes that both the PIM and 
cumulated net investments are in fact adding up productive investments. To the extent that this is 
not the case, our estimated capital stock levels should be lower in developing countries –  but we 




How rich would countries be in the year 2000 had they followed the Hartwick Rule since 1970? 
Based on the preceding methodology, Table A1 presents the year 2000 produced capital stock 
and the changes in this stock which would result from the alternative investment rules. The 
countries shown in this table are those having both exhaustible resources and a sufficiently long 
time series of data on gross investment and resource rents. For reference, the table also shows the 
average share of resource rents in GDP over 1970-2000. Note that negative entries in this table 
imply that countries actually invested more than the policy rule suggests. 
 
For the standard Hartwick rule Figure 1 scatters resource dependence, expressed as the average 
share of exhaustible resource rents in GDP, against the percentage difference between actual 
capital accumulation and counterfactual capital accumulation. Using 5% of GDP as the threshold 
for high resource dependence, Figure 1 divides countries into the four groups shown. 
 
Figure 1 – Resource abundance and capital accumulation (standard Hartwick rule) 
 
The top-right quadrant of the graph displays countries with high resource dependence and a 
counterfactual capital stock that is higher than the actual (baseline) capital stock. The bottom-left 
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stock that is higher than would be obtained under the Hartwick rule. These two quadrants include 
most of the countries in our sample, indicating a high negative correlation between resource 
abundance and the difference between baseline and counterfactual capital accumulation – a 
simple regression shows that a 1% increase in resource dependence is associated with a 9% 
increased difference between counterfactual and actual capital. Clearly the countries in the top-
right quadrant have not been following the Hartwick rule. Economies with very low levels of 
capital accumulation despite high rents include Nigeria (oil), Venezuela (oil), Trinidad and 
Tobago (oil and gas),  and Zambia (copper) – with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, all of 
these countries experienced declines in real per capita income over 1970-2000. In the opposite 
quadrant, economies with low exhaustible resource rent shares but high levels of capital 
accumulation include Korea, Thailand, Brazil and India. A number of high income countries are 
also in this group. 
 
Figure 1 shows that no country with resource rents higher than 15% of GDP has followed the 
Hartwick rule. In many cases the differences are huge. Nigeria, a major oil exporter, could have 
had a year 2000 stock of produced capital five times higher than the actual stock. Moreover, if 
these investments had taken place, oil would play a much smaller role in the Nigerian economy 
today, with likely beneficial impacts on policies affecting other sectors of the economy
5. 
Venezuela could have four times as much produced capital. In per capita terms, the economies of 
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon, all rich in petroleum, could today have a stock of 
produced capital of roughly $30,000 per person, comparable to South Korea (see Figure 2). 
 
Consumption rather than investment of resources rents is common in resource rich countries, but 
there are exceptions to the trend. In the bottom-right quadrant of Figure 1 are high resource 
dependence countries which have invested more than the level of exhaustible resource rents. 
Indonesia, China, Egypt, and Malaysia stand out in this group, while Chile and Mexico have 


















                                                 
5 We are grateful to Alan Gelb for pointing this out.   7
Figure 2 – Actual and counterfactual produced capital (per capita) – 2000 
 
 
Among the countries with relatively low natural resource dependence and higher counterfactual 
capital, we find Ghana (gold, bauxite) and Zimbabwe (gold). This is indicative of very low levels 
of capital accumulation in these economies. 
 
Figure 3 highlights countries which have invested more than their resource rents (as shown by 
the negative entries on the left side of the figure) but have failed to maintain constant genuine 
investment levels of at least 5% of 1987 GDP (as shown by the entries on the right). Developing 
countries in this group include Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Cameroon and Argentina. A number 
of high income countries also appear in the figure. Sweden could have a stock of capital 36% 
higher if it had maintained constant genuine investment levels at the specified target. The 
corresponding difference for the UK is 27%, for Norway 25% and for Denmark 22%. The 
generally low level of genuine investment levels in the Nordic countries is particularly 
surprising. Are these countries trading off inter-generational equity against intra-generational 















































































































































































































































































Produced Capital with Hartwick Rule
Produced Capital with 5% constant saving  8
 
Figure 3 – Capital accumulation under the Hartwick and constant net investment rules 
 
 
Finally, the next-to-last column in Table A1 shows the change in produced assets for countries if 
they had genuine investments of at least 5% of 1987 GDP. The positive figures indicate that, 
with the exception of Singapore, all countries experienced at least one year over 1970-2000 






As suggested in Hamilton and Withagen (2004), applying the standard Hartwick rule as 
development policy would be extreme – it implies a commitment to zero net saving for all time. 
Conversely, the constant genuine saving rule embodies a commitment to building wealth at each 
point in time. In a risky world this may be a more palatable development policy. 
 
The Hartwick rule counterfactual calculations show how even a moderate saving effort, 
equivalent to the average saving effort of the poorest countries in the world, could have 
substantially increased the wealth of resource-dependent economies. Of course, for the most 
resource-dependent countries such as Nigeria there is nothing moderate about the implied rate of 
investment – a Nigerian genuine investment rate of 36.1% of GDP in 1987 is what our 
calculations suggest under the constant genuine investment rule. 
 
The savings rules presented here are appealing in their simplicity. Maintaining a constant level of 
genuine saving will yield a development path where consumption grows monotonically, even as 





















Change in produced capital under the constant net 
investment rule
Change in produced capital under the
standard Hartwick rule  9
exhaustible resource stocks are run down. The real world is more complex. Poor countries place 
a premium on maintaining consumption levels, with negative effects on saving – the alternative 
may be starvation. At the same time financial crises, social instability and natural disasters all 
have deleterious effects on saving. Holding to a simple policy rule in such circumstances would 
be no small feat. 
 
Saving effort is of course not the whole story in sustaining development. Savings must be 
channeled into productive investments that can underpin future welfare, rather than ‘white 
elephant’ projects. As Sarraf and Jiwanji (2002) document, Botswana’s successful bid to avoid 
the resource curse was built upon a whole range of sound macroeconomic and sectoral policies, 
underpinned by generally positive political economy. Botswana’s absorptive capacity for public 
investment was a real concern to policy makers, who were prepared to hold resource revenues 
offshore rather than engage in wasteful investments.   10








G = 0 
% difference 
I




G >= 5% of 
1987 GDP 
% difference 
Rent / GDP 
Average 
(1970-2000) 
Nigeria 53.5 358.9% 413.6% 413.6% 32.6%
Venezuela, RB  175.9 272.1% 326.1% 326.1% 27.7%
Congo, Rep.  13.9 57.0% 78.0% 116.9% 25.2%
Mauritania 3.0 112.3% 153.7% 154.0% 25.0%
Gabon 19.7 80.3% 105.5% 130.4% 24.1%
Trinidad and Tobago  13.7 182.1% 238.3% 239.1% 23.6%
Algeria 195.4 50.6% 80.9% 83.9% 23.3%
Bolivia 13.7 116.1% 169.8% 177.5% 12.8%
Indonesia 540.6 -26.5% 3.8% 32.1% 12.5%
Ecuador 37.7 95.3% 158.0% 158.3% 11.6%
Zambia 7.5 312.3% 383.4% 388.0% 11.5%
Guyana 2.1 149.3% 185.6% 191.2% 11.4%
China 2899.4 -62.1% -45.0% 5.1% 10.8%
Egypt, Arab Rep.  159.7 -12.9% 28.1% 36.2% 9.5%
Chile 151.4 -3.0% 31.6% 54.0% 9.5%
Malaysia 305.2 -52.7% -31.4% 6.6% 8.3%
Mexico 975.5 -1.5% 35.3% 42.2% 8.2%
Peru 132.3 37.2% 98.1% 103.9% 7.5%
Cameroon 24.1 -9.3% 54.8% 67.6% 6.5%
South Africa  349.5 50.7% 109.3% 115.8% 6.5%
Jamaica 13.4 39.9% 87.8% 99.6% 5.7%
Colombia 198.0 -19.7% 30.4% 39.3% 5.3%
Norway 456.6 -14.3% 24.6% 33.0% 4.3%
India 965.4 -52.9% -18.3% 8.6% 3.4%
Zimbabwe 14.9 9.1% 64.8% 89.1% 3.3%
United States  16926.7 -39.8% 12.9% 26.1% 2.7%
Argentina 569.6 -6.9% 49.4% 53.9% 2.6%
Togo 3.6 -26.8% 22.7% 55.1% 2.6%
Pakistan 125.6 -50.7% -1.7% 11.1% 2.2%
Hungary 149.1 -43.5% 8.7% 22.3% 2.2%
Morocco 93.8 -59.1% -16.3% 7.8% 2.0%
Brazil 1750.5 -59.0% -6.6% 9.1% 1.9%
United Kingdom  2400.1 -32.7% 27.3% 32.8% 1.6%
Dominican Republic  33.8 -73.0% -27.9% 1.2% 1.6%
Philippines 195.0 -58.4% -14.5% 10.6% 1.5%
Honduras 12.3 -66.9% -29.7% 8.9% 1.5%
Ghana 16.1 30.6% 73.2% 76.7% 1.0%
Fiji 3.6 -36.5% 26.9% 59.3% 0.9%
Benin 4.6 -72.7% -21.7% 10.6% 0.8%
Senegal 10.0 -44.0% 14.2% 27.5% 0.7%
Thailand 520.6 -86.3% -63.6% 3.0% 0.7%
Haiti 2.8 -62.7% 109.2% 109.5% 0.6%
Korea, Rep.  1607.6 -93.5% -68.6% 0.9% 0.6%
Israel 215.8 -72.8% -31.3% 4.2% 0.5%
Cote d'Ivoire  16.1 -21.2% 71.1% 108.7% 0.5%  11
 
Produced 




G = 0 
% difference 
I




G >= 5% of 
1987 GDP 
% difference 
Rent / GDP 
Average 
(1970-2000) 
Bangladesh 89.7 -59.0% -12.9% 15.5% 0.5%
Rwanda 3.9 -83.2% -6.9% 24.6% 0.4%
Sweden 508.0 -31.1% 35.6% 36.1% 0.4%
Nicaragua 6.9 -34.9% 8.1% 44.8% 0.3%
Spain 1623.6 -58.9% -15.1% 6.1% 0.3%
Denmark 437.2 -33.0% 21.9% 28.7% 0.2%
France 3724.7 -55.0% -1.9% 6.9% 0.1%
Italy 2711.2 -44.8% 7.5% 10.2% 0.1%
Finland 347.6 -40.9% 11.6% 23.3% 0.1%
Belgium 681.9 -48.0% 2.3% 10.4% 0.1%
Niger 3.0 9.7% 95.2% 136.1% 0.1%
Burundi 1.6 -87.3% 10.1% 30.2% 0.1%
Portugal 308.8 -71.0% -30.8% 5.7% 0.0%
Costa Rica  24.1 -80.0% -30.6% 3.6% 0.0%
El Salvador  17.1 -59.7% -2.5% 24.6% 0.0%
Hong Kong, China  445.9 -88.6% -56.4% 0.9% 0.0%
Kenya 20.1 -51.9% 2.0% 20.8% 0.0%
Madagascar 4.9 -26.9% 62.4% 65.5% 0.0%
Sri Lanka  41.2 -88.1% -55.4% 1.0% 0.0%
Malawi 4.6 -26.8% 9.4% 68.2% 0.0%
Uruguay 29.9 -55.5% 22.1% 37.2% 0.0%
Luxembourg 43.3 -63.2% -22.0% 15.7% 0.0%
Paraguay 23.7 -88.6% -46.6% 3.0% 0.0%
Lesotho 5.7 -95.7% -79.9% 0.1% 0.0%
Singapore 314.8 -92.7% -73.2% 0.0% 0.0%
 
Note: negative entries indicate that hypothetical produced assets would be lower than observed 
assets under the specified rule.  12
Annex I. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Expressions (A1)-(A3) establish some basic properties of the path defined by the constant net 
saving rule: 
 




G F R F K F K R F K F C K R K R K = − = − + = & & & & & & & . (A2) 
 
Constant returns to scale implies that, 
 
G K F K R F K F K F C K R K − = − + = − = & &  (A3) 
 







F F K F R F F K K R RK RR R + − = ⇒ = + =
&
& & & . (A4) 
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, which has solution, 
 
() ( ) () [] α α α − − + − = 1
1
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Proposition 2 and expression (A3) can be used along with the preceding expressions for R and F 
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Since  () () 0
1
0 0 0 0 S R K S FR
− =
β α β , this expression can be solved for  ( ) 0 R  to yield, 
 
















































Here superscript G  denotes values on the path for the constant savings rule, while superscript H 
denotes values on the Hartwick rule ( 0 = G ) path
6. Feasibility (positive initial period resource 




G − = − − = 0 0 0 0 0 α , it 
follows (i) that  () () 0 0
H G C C < , and (ii) that  ( ) 0
G F G α <  is necessary for feasibility (positive 
initial period consumption). This implies that 
 
() () () () 0 0 1 0
1
2













Initial resource extraction is lower on the constant genuine saving path than on the Hartwick rule 
path, and feasibility ensures a strict lower limit for this value. 
                                                 
6 Note that, since  () () () 0 , 0 0 R K F F = , we do not have an analytic solution for  ( ) 0 R  in expression (A9).   14
 
























0 . (A11) 
 
Total wealth is therefore greater under the constant savings rule than under the Hartwick Rule. 
Note that total wealth is independent of the initial resource endowment  0 S  under the Hartwick 
Rule. Feasibility ( () 0
G F G α < ) implies that, 
 





















+ < < . 
 
Total wealth under the constant savings rule is therefore constrained by bounds that are 
independent of initial resource endowment. 
 
Finally, (A2) implies that, 
 
() ( ) () [] G R K t G
R
K















α α α &  
 
so that, by integrating and applying expression (3), 
 
() ( ) () [] () G F G t R K C − + + −
−
=





α α . (A12) 
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